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Larry Seltzer is the former editorial director of BYTE, Dark Reading, and Network Computing at UBM Tech and has spent over a decade consulting and writing on technology subjects, primarily in the area of security. Larry began his career as a Software Engineer at the now-defunct Desktop Software Corporation in Princeton, New Jersey, on the team that wrote the NPL 4GL query language.
Cisco → DSLReports speed test causes disconnect from Meraki wireless. DSLReports speed test causes disconnect from Meraki wireless. Just Little Snitch which I’ve disabled. Feb 01, 2017 Question: Q: AirPlayXPCHelper tries to connect to unknown home network. I do not understand why Little Snitch is interpreting this as local traffic (when the address is not in the local DHCP scope), a bug with Little Snitch perhaps? I’m seeing this from all my El Capitan Macs, both wireless and wired. In my case I see connections to.
By now, any sentient IT person knows the perils of open Wi-Fi. Those free connections in cafes and hotels don’t encrypt network traffic, so others on the network can read your traffic and possibly hijack your sessions. But one of the main solutions to this problem has a hole in it that isn’t widely appreciated.
Large sites like Twitter and Google have adopted SSL broadly in order to protect users on such networks. But for broader protection, many people use a virtual private network (VPN). Most people, if they use a VPN at all, use a corporate one. But there are public services as well, such as F-Secure’s Freedome and Privax’s HideMyAss. Your device connects with the VPN service’s servers and establishes an encrypted tunnel for all your Internet traffic from the device to their servers. The service then proxies all your traffic to and from its destination.
It’s a better solution than relying on SSL from websites for a number of reasons: with a VPN, all of the traffic from your device is encrypted, whether the site you are visiting has SSL or not. Even if the Wi-Fi access point to which you are connected is malicious, it can’t see the traffic. Any party that is in a position to monitor your traffic can’t even see the addresses and URLs of the sites with which you are communicating, something they can do with SSL over open Wi-Fi.
But there is a hole in this protection, and it happens at connect time. The VPN cannot connect until you connect to the Internet, but the VPN connection is not instantaneous. In many, perhaps most public Wi-Fi sites, your Wi-Fi hardware may connect automatically to the network, but you must open a browser to a ‘captive portal,’ which comes from the local router, and attempt to gain access to the Internet beyond. You may have to manually accept a TOS (Terms of Service) agreement first.
In this period before your VPN takes over, what might be exposed depends on what software you run. Do you use a POP3 or IMAP e-mail client? If they check automatically, that traffic is out in the clear for all to see, including potentially the login credentials. Other programs, like instant messaging client, may try to log on.
I tested this scenario at a Starbucks with Google Wi-Fi while running Wireshark. Thousands of packets went back and forth on the open network before the VPN attempted to connect. A quick scan of the list found nothing that looked dangerous, and in fact the software on my system used TLS 1.2 in almost all cases, which was quite a relief. But your configuration may be different from mine, and even if your software attempts to use HTTPS, it could be vulnerable to attacks like SSLStrip, which tricks the software into using open HTTP anyway.
Windows 7 on mac free. Dec 06, 2018 In macOS High Sierra and earlier, you can install Windows 10, Windows 8.1, and Windows 7 using Boot Camp Assistant on supported Mac models. Information about products not manufactured by Apple, or independent websites not controlled or tested. After installing Windows, Boot Camp drivers that support your Mac hardware start installing. Note: If the support software doesn’t install automatically, you need to install it manually. For instructions, see the Apple Support article If the Boot Camp installer doesn’t open after using Boot Camp Assistant. Bootcamp will create a Windows partition from a. A USB flash drive that contains a Windows 7 ISO image downloaded from Microsoft. Boot Camp Assistant helps you burn the image to the flash drive. See the Lion Bootcamp install notes from Apple — similar notes exist for Snow Leopard. I have installed the Windows 8 RC using this method. Jul 08, 2017 Before you install Windows, stop and think about whether or not Boot Camp is the best choice for your needs. There are a couple of drawbacks to consider. When you use Boot Camp to install Windows on your Mac, you’ll need to re-partition your drive, which is going to take up quite a bit of your available drive space. May 17, 2017 Windows 7 will begin to install, during the installation your system will reboot, when this happens, you’ll need to remove the Windows 7 DVD. With the Windows 7 DVD removed, your Mac will automatically boot back into Windows 7, and the installation will continue.
This gap in coverage may only be a matter of seconds, but that’s enough to expose valuable information like logon credentials. Try running a network monitoring tool like Microsoft’s TCPView for Windows or Little Snitch for Mac before you establish your Internet connection and see what happens in those first few seconds. The information may be protected by encryption, but it can carry details about your system configuration that could be used to identify it — or provide clues for an attacker.
Even beyond this time gap, sometimes VPN connections go down. At least in the default configurations of most operating systems, the applications on the system will fail over to the open Wi-Fi connection. Don’t blame just the public VPN vendors. The same problem is true of corporate VPNs, unless they go to the trouble of configuring the system around the problem.
So, how do you do that? Shaun Murphy, a founder of PrivateGiant (www.privategiant.com), which makes products to protect the security and privacy of online communications, suggests that you do it with a software firewall, either one that comes with your operating system or a third-party one:
The basic approach is to prevent all inbound and outbound connections on your public networks (or zones) with the exception of a browser that you use to connect to captive portals and such. That browser should be one you only use for this purpose and, perhaps, some lightweight browsing (certainly not email, social, or any other personally identifiable purpose.) Using that same firewall, set up a profile/zone for VPN traffic where inbound / outbound traffic are less restricted (I recommend blocking outbound connections by default and then adding in programs as needed, it’s surprising how many programs call home.. all the time.) The nice thing about this approach is your email client, primary web browser, and other applications you use will be useless unless you are actively connected to the VPN.
Sean Sullivan, security advisor at F-Secure, gave us the same advice with the useful addition that ‘..you’d want to launch the browser [for the captive portal] in ‘safe mode’ so the plugins are disabled.’ If you’re a Firefox or Google Chrome user, then Internet Explorer and Safari should fit the bill. You’ve got them on the system anyway.
Configuring firewall software on your PC to block non-VPN traffic isn’t all that easy. It varies across operating systems and products, and it may not even be possible in Windows 8.1. On Windows, here’s a summary of what you’d need to do:
- Connect to the VPN of your choice using the normal procedure for that product.
- In the Network and Sharing Center in Control Panel, make sure the VPN connection is set as a Public network, and the home or public Wi-Fi network is set as Home or Office (Home is better). (In Windows 8 and later this can be problematic unless the network connection is brand new, because Windows 8.x provides no user interface with which to change the location type — so the whole exercise may be impossible — unless you first delete and recreate all your network connections.)
- Finally, in the Windows Firewall in Control Panel go to the Advanced Settings. Create a rule to block all programs from connecting on Public networks. Then create a rule to allow both the VPN program and the browser you want to use for the captive portal to be allowed to connect on Public networks. You will need to set these rules both for inbound and outbound connections.
BolehVPN of Hong Kong has produced a more detailed set of instructions for using the Windows Firewall in Windows 7. On a Mac, you can achieve the same results with the aforementioned Little Snitch firewall. And Douglas Crawford at BestVPN.com has instructions for the Comodo Firewall on Windows, but says that he couldn’t get the procedure to work on the standard Windows Firewall in Windows 8.1.
All in all, it’s a fair amount of trouble to go through, and it’s a configuration you’d only want on open Wi-Fi. If you work where there is secure WPA2 encryption on the Wi-Fi, then the VPN is probably not worth the overhead and the reduced network performance.
The real solution to this problem isn’t hacking with firewalls, it’s providing encryption by default in public Wi-Fi. This isn’t done much now because that would mean supplying passwords, and the support overhead would just be too great for a cafe. The result is that we have an insecure situation with bad, but adequate, usability.
The Wi-Fi Alliance has had a solution for this problem nearly in place for years, called Passpoint. The Passpoint protocol was created to allow for Wi-Fi ‘roaming’ by creating a way for access points to grant access by way of a third-party credential, such as your Google ID or your ISP account. When you connect to a public access point through Passpoint, it authenticates you and establishes a secure connection using WPA2-Enterprise, the gold standard in Wi-Fi security — instead of leaving your traffic unencrypted or visible on the shared wireless LAN.
The reason that you don’t yet see Passpoint everywhere is that it requires the Wi-Fi provider — such as a consumer ISP, Google, or Boingo — to trust certain authentication providers and to advertise a list of them to connecting devices — the longer, the better. And users would need to configure Passpoint on their system to use one or more of their credentials when connecting to such a network. There hasn’t been wide adoption of Passpoint yet — while it’s been put to use in certain high-volume locations, such as many airports, it’s still pretty uncommon.
The Wi-Fi Alliance now says that Passpoint is gaining traction in the enterprise as a way to handle BYOD. That’s interesting if true, but it doesn’t address the pain point of public Wi-Fi privacy. Passpoint has the potential to close the VPN data leakage window and make public Internet services far more secure. In its absence, there is no good solution.
(Redirected from Database firewall)
An application firewall is a form of firewall that controls input, output, and/or access from, to, or by an application or service. It operates by monitoring and potentially blocking the input, output, or system service calls that do not meet the configured policy of the firewall. The application firewall is typically built to control all network traffic on any OSI layer up to the application layer. It is able to control applications or services specifically, unlike a stateful network firewall, which is — without additional software — unable to control network traffic regarding a specific application. There are two primary categories of application firewalls, network-based application firewalls and host-based application firewalls.
Network-based application firewalls[edit]
A network-based application layer firewall is a computer networking firewall operating at the application layer of a protocol stack,[1] and is also known as a proxy-based or reverse-proxy firewall. Application firewalls specific to a particular kind of network traffic may be titled with the service name, such as a web application firewall. They may be implemented through software running on a host or a stand-alone piece of network hardware. Often, it is a host using various forms of proxy servers to proxy traffic before passing it on to the client or server. Because it acts on the application layer, it may inspect the contents of traffic, blocking specified content, such as certain websites, viruses, or attempts to exploit known logical flaws in client software.
Modern application firewalls may also offload encryption from servers, block application input/output from detected intrusions or malformed communication, manage or consolidate authentication, or block content that violates policies.
History[edit]
Gene Spafford of Purdue University, Bill Cheswick at AT&T Laboratories, and Marcus Ranum described a third generation firewall known as an application layer firewall. Marcus Ranum’s work, based on the firewall created by Paul Vixie, Brian Reed and Jeff Mogul, spearheaded the creation of the first commercial product. The product was released by DEC, named the DEC SEAL by Geoff Mulligan — Secure External Access Link. DEC’s first major sale was on June 13, 1991 to Dupont.
Under a broader DARPA contract at TIS, Marcus Ranum, Wei Xu, and Peter Churchyard developed the Firewall Toolkit (FWTK), and made it freely available under license in October 1993.[2] The purposes for releasing the freely available, not for commercial use, FWTK were: to demonstrate, via the software, documentation, and methods used, how a company with (at the time) 11 years’ experience in formal security methods, and individuals with firewall experience, developed firewall software; to create a common base of very good firewall software for others to build on (so people did not have to continue to ‘roll their own’ from scratch); and to ‘raise the bar’ of firewall software being used. However, FWTK was a basic application proxy requiring the user interactions.
In 1994, Wei Xu extended the FWTK with the Kernel enhancement of IP stateful filter and socket transparent. This was the first transparent firewall, known as the inception of the third generation firewall, beyond a traditional application proxy (the second generation firewall), released as the commercial product known as Gauntlet firewall. Gauntlet firewall was rated one of the top application firewalls from 1995 until 1998, the year it was acquired by Network Associates Inc, (NAI). Network Associates continued to claim that Gauntlet was the ‘worlds most secure firewall’ but in May 2000, security researcher Jim Stickley discovered a large vulnerability in the firewall, allowing remote access to the operating system and bypassing the security controls.[3]Stickley discovered a second vulnerability a year later, effectively ending Gauntlet firewalls security dominance.[4]
The key benefit of application layer filtering is that it can ‘understand’ certain applications and protocols (such as File Transfer Protocol, DNS, or web browsing), and it can detect whether an unwanted protocol is being sneaked through on a non-standard port or whether a protocol is being abused in any harmful way.
Host-based application firewalls[edit]
A host-based application firewall can monitor any application input, output, and/or system service calls made from, to, or by an application. This is done by examining information passed through system calls instead of or in addition to a network stack. A host-based application firewall can only provide protection to the applications running on the same host.
Application firewalls function by determining whether a process should accept any given connection. Application firewalls accomplish their function by hooking into socket calls to filter the connections between the application layer and the lower layers of the OSI model. Application firewalls that hook into socket calls are also referred to as socket filters. Application firewalls work much like a packet filter but application filters apply filtering rules (allow/block) on a per process basis instead of filtering connections on a per port basis. Generally, prompts are used to define rules for processes that have not yet received a connection. It is rare to find application firewalls not combined or used in conjunction with a packet filter.[5]
Also, application firewalls further filter connections by examining the process ID of data packets against a ruleset for the local process involved in the data transmission. The extent of the filtering that occurs is defined by the provided ruleset. Given the variety of software that exists, application firewalls only have more complex rulesets for the standard services, such as sharing services. These per process rulesets have limited efficacy in filtering every possible association that may occur with other processes. Also, these per process ruleset cannot defend against modification of the process via exploitation, such as memory corruption exploits.[5] Because of these limitations, application firewalls are beginning to be supplanted by a new generation of application firewalls that rely on mandatory access control (MAC), also referred to as sandboxing, to protect vulnerable services. Examples of next generation host-based application firewalls that control system service calls by an application are AppArmor[6] and the TrustedBSD MAC framework (sandboxing) in Mac OS X.[7]
Host-based application firewalls may also provide network-based application firewalling.
Sandboxing systems can also control file and process accesses as well as network access. Commercial sandboxing systems are available for both Windows and Unix type OSes.
Implementations[edit]
There are various application firewalls available, including both free and open source software and commercial products.
Mac OS X[edit]
Mac OS X, as of Leopard, includes an implementation of the TrustedBSD MAC framework, which is taken from FreeBSD.[8] The TrustedBSD MAC framework is used to sandbox some services, such as mDNSresponder, much like AppArmor is used to sandbox services in some Linux distributions. The TrustedBSD MAC framework provides a default layer of firewalling given the default configuration of the sharing services in Mac OS X Leopard and Snow Leopard.
The Application firewall located in the security preferences of Mac OS X starting with Leopard provides the functionality of this type of firewall to a limited degree via the use of code signing apps added to the firewall list. For the most part, this Application firewall only manages network connections by checking to see if incoming connections are directed toward an app in the firewall list and applies the rule (block/allow) specified for those apps. Third-party applications can provide extended functionality, including filtering out outgoing connections by app.
Linux[edit]
This is a list of security software packages for Linux, allowing filtering of application to OS communication, possibly on a by-user basis:
- Kerio Control — a commercial Product
- ModSecurity — also works under Windows, Mac OS X, Solaris and other versions of Unix. ModSecurity is designed to work with the web-servers IIS, Apache2 and NGINX.
Windows[edit]
Network appliances[edit]
These devices are sold as hardware network appliances and in some instances as virtual images that run on basic server hardware.
NextGeneration Firewalls:
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- Fortinet FortiGate Series
- Juniper Networks SRX Series
- SonicWALL TZ/NSA/SuperMassive Series
WebApplication Firewalls/LoadBalancers:
- A10 Networks Web Application Firewall
- Barracuda Networks Web Application Firewall/Load Balancer ADC
- F5 Networks BIG-IP Application Security Manager
- Fortinet FortiWeb Series
Others:
Specialized application firewalls[edit]
Specialized application firewalls offer a rich feature-set in protecting and controlling a specific application. Most specialized network appliance application firewalls are for web applications.
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History[edit]
Large-scale web server hacker attacks, such as the 1996 PHF CGI exploit,[9] lead to the investigation into security models to protect web applications. This was the beginning of what is currently referred to as the web application firewall (WAF) technology family. Early entrants in the market started appearing in 1999, such as Perfecto Technologies’s AppShield,[10] (who later changed their name to Sanctum and in 2004 was acquired by Watchfire[11] (acquired by IBM in 2007), which focused primarily on the ecommerce market and protected against illegal web page character entries. NetContinuum (acquired by Barracuda Networks in 2007) approached the issue by providing pre-configured ‘security servers’. Such pioneers faced proprietary rule-set issues, business case obstacles and cost barriers to wide adoption, however, the need for such solutions was taking root.
In 2002, the open source project ModSecurity, run by Thinking Stone and later acquired by Breach Security in 2006,[12] was formed with a mission to solve these obstacles and make WAF technology accessible for every company. With the release of the core rule set, a unique[citation needed] open source rule set for protecting Web applications, based on the OASIS Web Application Security Technical Committee’s (WAS TC) vulnerability work, the market had a stable, well documented and standardized model to follow.
In 2003, the WAS TC’s work was expanded and standardized across the industry through the work of the Open Web Application Security Project’s (OWASP) Top 10 List. This annual ranking is a classification scheme for web security vulnerabilities, a model to provide guidance for initial threat, impact, and a way to describe conditions that can be used by both assessment and protection tools, such as a WAF. This list would go on to become the industry benchmark for many compliance schemes.
In 2004, large traffic management and security vendors, primarily in the network layer space, entered the WAF market through a flurry of mergers and acquisitions. Key among these was the mid-year move by F5 to acquire Magnifire WebSystems,[13] and the integration of the latter’s TrafficShield software solution with the former’s Big-IP traffic management system. This same year, F5 acquired AppShield and discontinued the technology. Further consolidation occurred in 2006 with the acquisition of Kavado by Protegrity,[14] and Citrix Systems’ buying of Teros.[15]
Until this point, the WAF market was dominated by niche providers who focused on web application layer security. Now the market was firmly directed at integrating WAF products with the large network technologies — load balancing, application servers, network firewalls, etc. — and began a rush of rebranding, renaming and repositioning the WAF. Options were confusing, expensive and still hardly understood by the larger market.
In 2006, the Web Application Security Consortium was formed to help make sense of the now widely divergent WAF market. Dubbed the Web Application Firewall Evaluation Criteria project (WAFEC), this open community of users, vendors, academia and independent analysts and researchers created a common evaluation criterion for WAF adoption that is still maintained today.
Wide-scale interest in the WAF began in earnest, tied to the 2006 PCI Security Standards Council formation and compliance mandate. Major payment card brands (AMEX, Visa, MasterCard, etc.) formed PCI as a way to regulate security practices across the industry and curtail the rampant credit card fraud taking place. In particular, this standard mandated that all web applications must be secure, either through secure development or use of a WAF (requirement 6.6). The OWASP Top 10 forms the backbone of this requirement.
With the increased focus on virtualization and Cloud computing to maximize existing resources, scaling of WAF technology has become the most recent milestone.
By 2010, the WAF market had matured to a market exceeding $200M in size according to Forrester. In a February 2010 report, Web Application Firewall: 2010 And Beyond, Forrester analyst Chenxi Wang wrote, ‘Forrester estimates the 2009 market revenue of the WAF+ market to be nearly $200 million, and the market will grow by a solid 20% in 2010. Security and risk managers can expect two WAF trends in 2010: 1) midmarket-friendly WAFs will become available, and 2) larger enterprises will gravitate toward the increasingly prevalent WAF+ solutions.’ She also wrote that ‘Imperva is the stand alone WAF leader.’
Distributed web application firewalls[edit]
Distributed Web Application Firewall (also called a dWAF) is a member of the web application firewall (WAF) and Web applications security family of technologies. Purely software-based, the dWAF architecture is designed as separate components able to physically exist in different areas of the network. This advance in architecture allows the resource consumption of the dWAF to be spread across a network rather than depend on one appliance, while allowing complete freedom to scale as needed. In particular, it allows the addition / subtraction of any number of components independently of each other for better resource management. This approach is ideal for large and distributed virtualized infrastructures such as private, public or hybrid cloud models.
Cloud-based web application firewalls[edit]
Cloud-based web application firewall is also member of the web application firewall (WAF) and web applications security family of technologies. This technology is unique due to the fact that it is platform agnostic and does not require any hardware or software changes on the host. All providers but one require a DNS change, wherein all web traffic is routed through the WAF where it is inspected and threats are thwarted. Cloud-based WAFs are typically centrally orchestrated, which means that threat detection information is shared among all the tenants of the service. This collaboration results in improved detection rates and lower false positives. Like other cloud-based solutions, this technology is elastic, scalable and is typically offered as a pay-as-you grow service. This approach is ideal for cloud-based web applications and small or medium-sized websites that require web application security but are not willing or able to make software or hardware changes to their systems.
See also[edit]
References[edit]
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- ^Luis F. Medina (2003). The Weakest Security Link Series (1st ed.). IUniverse. p. 54. ISBN978–0–595–26494–0.
- ^’Firewall toolkit V1.0 release’. Retrieved 2018–12–28.
- ^Kevin Pulsen (May 22, 2000). ‘Security Hole found in NAI Firewall’. securityfocus.com. Retrieved 2018–08–14.
- ^Kevin Pulsen (September 5, 2001). ‘Gaping hole in NAI’s Gauntlet firewall’. theregister.co.uk. Retrieved 2018–08–14.
- ^ ab’Software Firewalls: Made of Straw? Part 1 of 2'. Symantec.com. Symantec Connect Community. 2010–06–29. Retrieved 2013–09–05.
- ^’Firewall your applications with AppArmor’. Retrieved 2010–02–15.
- ^’The TrustedBSD Project’. The TrustedBSD Project. 2008–11–21. Archived from the original on 23 January 2010. Retrieved 2010–02–15.
- ^’Mandatory Access Control (MAC) Framework’. TrustedBSD. Retrieved 2013–09–05.
- ^CERT (March 20, 1996). ‘CERT Advisory CA-1996–06 Vulnerability in NCSA/Apache CGI example code’. CERT Coordination Center. Retrieved 2010–11–17.
- ^Ellen Messmer (September 7, 1999). ‘New tool blocks wily e-comm hacker tricks’. CNN. Retrieved 2010–11–17.
- ^Jaikumar Vijayan (August 4, 2004). ‘Q&A: Watchfire CTO sees Sanctum acquisition as a good fit’. Computerworld. Retrieved 2010–11–17.
- ^Jeremy Kirk (September 25, 2006). ‘Breach Security acquires rival firewall ModSecurity’. InfoWorld. Retrieved 2011–12–06.
- ^Tim Greene (June 1, 2004). ‘F5 buys Magnifire for $29 million’. Network World. Retrieved 2011–12–06.
- ^Linda Rosencrance (August 19, 2005). ‘Protegrity acquires Web apps security vendor Kavado’. Computerworld. Retrieved 2011–12–06.
- ^James Rogers (November 15, 2005). ‘Citrix Picks Up Teros’. networkcomputing.com. Retrieved 2011–12–06.
External links[edit]
- Web Application Firewall, Open Web Application Security Project
- Web Application Firewall Evaluation Criteria, from the Web Application Security Consortium
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